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Abstract 
Most assessments of pension sustainability focus on the projected fall in spending. 
However interest in the impact on adequacy, usually measured by replacement rates, 
is increasing. In this paper we show that replacement rates have significant defects, 
related to being point-in-time indicators and the use of unrepresentative assumptions. 
We argue for the use of pension wealth calculated using more realistic assumptions. 
Looking at ten EU countries, we find that while generosity decreased significantly, 
systems‟ effectiveness in alleviating poverty remain strong in countries where 
minimum pensions were improved. However, moves to link benefits to contributions 
have raised concerns for women and for those on low incomes. Though reforms have 
reduced the fiscal challenge of ageing, in many countries pressures will persist and 
further reforms are likely. 
JEL Classification: H55, I38, J26. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent decades many European governments have embarked on substantial 
pension reforms.1 Most reviews show that these reforms‟ main consideration was 
long-term financial costs (and in some cases, especially in Eastern Europe, short-
term fiscal problems and a desire to reduce the state‟s role).2 However, policymakers 
are increasingly focusing on the broader impact of these changes. For instance, 
following a review of its involvement in reforms which found a neglect of the need that 
pension systems “reduce poverty and provide retirement income”,3 the World Bank‟s 
current stance is that “pension systems need to provide adequate, affordable, 
sustainable, and robust benefits”.4 Similarly after reaching an agreement among 
Member States in 2001 on common objectives on pension policy and on a voluntary 
process for political cooperation known as the open method of co-ordination (OMC), 
in 2012 the EU Commission prepared a white paper on pension reforms in which it 
argued that countries should “in the spirit of solidarity and fairness between and 
within generations, guarantee adequate retirement incomes for all and access to 
pensions which allow people to maintain, to a reasonable degree, their living 
standard after retirement”.5 
While the standard measure of a reform‟s fiscal success – reduced spending - is well-
known, despite many studies on the impact on generosity,6 there is no similar 
consensus on how best to measure pension adequacy. This notwithstanding there is 
a growing use, particularly by international institutions, of theoretical replacement 
rates. Yet, as will be argued in this paper‟s first section, this measure has many 
defects. In section 2, an alternative approach is proposed, based on estimates of 
pension wealth for ten European countries which made considerable reforms since 
the 1990s.7 These, namely Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
Poland, Slovakia, Sweden and UK, not only cover 70% of the EU‟s population, but 
also have very different pension systems and enacted varied reforms.8 The proposed 
indicators address many of the defects of theoretical replacement rates – such as the 
latter‟s limited ability to reflect the influence of different benefit indexation rules,9 
changes in pension age and life expectancy and the impact of systemic reforms10 on 
generosity.  
                                            
1
 For an overview of these reforms, see European Commission (2010) and OECD (2007). 
2
 See Zaidi/Grech (2007) and Schneider (2009). 
3
World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (2006). 
4
 Holzmann/Hinz (2005). 
5
 European Commission (2012). 
6
 For instance, see Zaidi/Grech (2007) and European Commission (2010). 
7
 Note that these estimates are based on the pension system rules as at 2010. The deterioration of 
the sovereign debt crisis led to some subsequent reforms, particularly in Hungary. 
8
 For a brief description of pension reforms in these countries, see OECD (2007). 
9
 Benefit indexation rules determine how the value of a benefit changes after it is awarded. 
10
 In a systemic reform, a scheme‟s financing and benefit accrual is changed. In most cases, systems 
are changed from pay-as-you-go defined benefit (where benefits are determined in relation to 
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2 Theoretical replacement rates – a review 
The theoretical replacement rate used by the EU in the OMC is defined as “the level 
of pension income the first year after retirement as a percentage of individual 
earnings at the moment of take-up of pensions…for an assumed hypothetical worker, 
who in the so-called „base case‟ has a given earnings and career profile (male, 
earnings of average wage constant over his fulltime 40 years career, retiring at 
65)”.11 The latest estimates for pensioners aged 65 and 75 are shown in Table 1, 
together with OECD estimates, restricted to just state pensions.12 The World Bank 
suggests that “for a typical, full-career worker, an initial target of net-of-tax income 
replacement from mandatory systems is likely to be about 40% of real earnings to 
maintain subsistence levels of income in retirement”, while systems offering rates 
above 60% are unaffordable.13 On this basis, Table 1 suggests that, on average,14 in 
the ten countries studied in this paper, state pensions are adequate. 
Table 1: Theoretical replacement rates (%) – OMC and OECD [in brackets] 
  
Gross replacement rate Net replacement rate 
At age 65 At age 75 At age 65 At age75 
Austria  69 [77] 58 84 [90] 73 
Finland 62 [58] 52 69 [65] 60 
France 64 [49] 54 78 [60] 65 
Germany 41 [42] 41 64 [56] 64 
Hungary 65 [44] 64 105 [62] 106 
Italy 80 [65] 68 88 [72] 76 
Poland 59 [29] 48 68 [33] 56 
Slovakia  58 [26] 53 75 [34] 71 
Sweden  68 [31] 65 71 [31] 68 
UK 61 [32] 54 73 [37] 66 
Average 60 [45] 53 75 [54] 67 
Note: Replacement rates are worked out on a gross and net (of income taxes and 
contributions) basis. OECD estimates do not include income from private pensions. 
Source: European Commission (2010), OECD (2011). 
                                                                                                                                        
an agreed pensionable income, financed out of current contributions) to defined contribution 
schemes (where benefits depend on contributions made, any accrued returns and the time to 
be spent receiving the benefit), either notional (i.e. benefits are still financed from current 
revenues) or funded (i.e. contributions are not immediately spent). 
11
 European Commission (2010). 
12
 See OECD (2011). 
13
 Holzmann/Hinz (2005). This is in line with International Labour Office (1952).  
14
 Throughout, the average across these ten countries is a weighted average by population. 
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Table 2: Net replacement rates and relative pension levels [in brackets] of state 
pensions (%) – OECD 
  
At 0.5 times 
average 
wages 
 At average 
wage 
At 1.5 times 
average wage 
Austria  91 [54] 90 [90] 84 [119] 
Finland 72 [42] 65 [65] 64 [88] 
France 69 [37] 60 [60] 53 [75] 
Germany 55 [33] 56 [56] 56 [78] 
Hungary 56 [35] 62 [62] 60 [82] 
Italy 72 [41] 72 [72] 72 [100] 
Poland 33 [17] 33 [33] 33 [49] 
Slovakia  31 [17] 34 [34] 35 [50] 
Sweden  45 [24] 31 [31] 24 [32] 
UK 62 [33] 37 [37] 27 [38] 
Average 60 [34] 54 [54] 50 [70] 
Note: Rates estimated assuming full career on different wages. Relative pension 
levels have the economy-wide average wages as the denominator, rather than the 
individual‟s own wage.  
Source: OECD (2011). 
However, as Blondell / Scarpetta (1999) points out, “there is no such thing as a single 
pension replacement rate in any national retirement scheme”. This because even 
with the simplest case – flat-rate universal pensions – the gross replacement rate will 
still differ for individuals as it is determined by their previous wage, while net 
replacement rates will be affected by tax system progressivity. In fact, OECD 
estimates presented in Table 2 show that in general, replacement rates for those on 
lower wages tend to be higher. The denominator of replacement rates can distort 
reality. While having a high replacement rate on a low level of previous income 
ensures a good degree of consumption smoothing; it would do little to alleviate the 
risk-of-poverty.Table 2 also shows relative pension levels, where benefits are 
compared to the average economy-wide wage. These suggest that pension 
generosity for those on low incomes is significantly less pronounced when taking the 
average wage as the numeraire, well below the World Bank suggested 40% 
benchmark.  
Heterogeneity in replacement rates poses significant hurdles to use them as pension 
adequacy measures. To be able to do this, one would need to know to what extent 
the hypothetical individual, for whom the theoretical replacement ratio is estimated, is 
Discussion Paper 15/2013 
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representative of the average pensioner. For instance, the EU‟s OMC indicator 
specifies a single male on average earnings, employed full-time for 40 years 
uninterruptedly and retiring at 65. Leaving aside the obvious issue of gender, the first 
consideration is that the average person does not retire at 65. Eurostat data suggest 
that the average exit age from the labour force of males in 2010 stood at 61.5 for the 
EU-27. Employment rates are well below 100%, particularly for women, tend to fall 
over the working age and differ greatly by country.15 Close to a fifth of the workforce, 
most of them women, work part-time. Moreover an average wage does not provide 
any indication of wage inequality. Eurostat‟s Structure of Earnings Survey reports that 
across the EU in 2010, the wage of those in the bottom tenth percentile of the wage 
distribution was more than 8 times that of those in the top tenth16 while earnings 
follow an evident age profile, accelerating rapidly at first before decelerating after age 
50.17  
The Commission is aware of these issues. European Commission (2009), for 
instance, notes that in Greece “a negligible portion of pensioners, below 3%, 
complete 40 contribution years before retirement”. Since average career length in 
Greece is 25 years, while the OMC indicator suggests that pensions in Greece are 
the most generous in the EU, the poverty rate among Greek pensioners is the fifth 
highest, as people do not get that implied generous pension. Only in 9 EU countries, 
men contribute 40 years or more prior to retirement.18 Given these issues, it is not 
surprising to find that there is only very weak correlation between net theoretical 
replacement rates and at-risk-of-poverty rates for the pensioner population.  
Besides the base case, the Commission publishes replacement rates that depart 
from its base assumptions; such as a case where the individual‟s wage rises 
gradually from average to twice the average, a broken career variant where there are 
no contributions for 10 years, cases where the break is of 3 years either because of 
unemployment or childcare, and variants of early and late retirement. Unsurprisingly, 
as shown in Table 3, these cases confirm that replacement rates vary a lot. Rising 
wage profiles tend to result in lower rates, either as entitlements are based on career-
average income rather than the final salary (e.g. Italy) or there are maximum 
pensionable rates (e.g. UK). Later retirement can yield very generous benefits (e.g. in 
Hungary the replacement rate is 17 percentage points higher), whereas early 
retirement is not as penalised (e.g. in Hungary the penalty of retiring early is 13 
percentage points). In some counties, e.g. Slovakia, taking time off to take care of 
children results in a significant drop in replacement rates whereas in others, such as 
Sweden, there is no such fall.  
                                            
15
 The employment rate for men (women) in 2011 ranged from 67% (43%) to 83% (77%) across the 
EU. That for those aged 55-64 was nearly a third below the EU average. 
16
 It also differs greatly. In Sweden those in the bottom tenth percentile get a wage a quarter less than 
the median wage; whereas in neighbouring Estonia the ratio is more like a half. 
17
 In the EU, in 2010, the mean wage of men aged under 30 was just three-fifths the mean wage of 
those aged 40-49. Those aged over 60 have a wage only 3% higher than the latter. 
18
 On average, across the EU, career length is 38 years for men and 30 years for women. 
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Table 3: Different OMC theoretical net replacement rates (%) 
  
Base 
case 
 
3 years 
unemployed 
 
3 years 
childcare 
break 
10 
years 
career 
break 
Retire 
at 63 
 
Retire 
at 67 
 
Wage 
rising to 
2xaverage 
Austria 84 83 82 70 77 88 76 
Finland 69 66 65 54 62 76 65 
France 78 73 75 58 62 89 55 
Germany 64 62 65 48 57 74 46 
Hungary 105 102 105 92 92 122 89 
Italy 88 84 76 68 84 93 72 
Poland 68 66 61 57 66 70 58 
Slovakia 75 54 53 57 64 87 56 
Sweden 65 60 65 NA 62 76 71 
UK 73 71 74 58 71 77 52 
Average 75 72 71 57 68 82 58 
Note: Replacement rates are worked out on a net of income taxes and contributions 
basis. They include income from private pensions if coverage is significant. 
Source: European Commission (2010). 
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3 Pension wealth - a more effective framework to measure 
the impact of pension reforms 
To summarise the previous section, theoretical replacement rates tend to be 
unrepresentative of actual outcomes due to unrealistic assumptions, coupled with a 
focus on individual wages as the numeraire. Interestingly there has been little 
discussion of another defect of replacement rates – namely their being point-in-time 
indicators. Isolating pension generosity at retirement fails to take into account 
differences in longevity and pension ages between generations and also ignores how 
payments change over retirement. A country with low life expectancy could afford to 
pay higher replacement rates to its citizens while imposing the same financial burden 
on workers as a country with higher life expectancy but with lower rates. Similarly a 
country where pensions lose their relative value over time can afford to pay a higher 
replacement rate at retirement than a country where the relative value is stable.  
These issues matter. Rising longevity has made pensions become so topical. 
Changing the pension age has been a frequent reform.19 Moreover, some countries 
(e.g. Italy, Sweden) have introduced systems penalising retiring at the same age if 
longevity rises, by linking more tightly projected benefits to contributions made. 
Another common reform has been the shift from uprating pensions in line with 
average wages (e.g. Austria, Germany). The impact of indexation on generosity is 
substantial. Table 1 shows that on average, across the ten countries being studied 
there is a drop of 11% in net replacement rates between age 65 and 75. Given that 
life expectancy for men and women is close to 20 years, this ten-year period 
constitutes just the half-life of a pension stream. If the relative value loss proceeds 
linearly, by the last year of life pensions would be a fifth less in earnings terms than at 
the beginning.  
One way of addressing these concerns is using estimates of pension wealth. 
Brugiavini et al. (2005), while noting that “there is no simple and unique definition” 
notes that “pension wealth is, broadly speaking, the present discounted value of 
future pension rights, taking into account of mortality prospects.” In mathematical 
terms this can be expressed as: 
    ∑  
            
 
     ………. (1) 
where     is pension wealth at age of retirement (h), S is the age of certain death, β 
is the pure time discount factor, a is the individual‟s age,    is the conditional survival 
probability at age (s) for an individual alive at age (a) and       is the pension 
expected at age (s).  
OECD (2011) suggests that pension wealth “can be thought of as the lump sum 
needed to buy an annuity giving the same flow of pension payments as that promised 
by mandatory retirement-income schemes”. Take, for instance, a case where the 
                                            
19
 See OECD (2011).  
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pension benefit is equivalent to 50% of average earnings for 20 years. Assuming 
away time preference, you would be as better off if you forgo receiving pensions in 
lieu of a payment equivalent to ten times average earnings. If however benefits are 
expected to fall in relative terms by a tenth every ten years (broadly in line with the 
fall seen in Table 1), you would require a payment of just nine times. Equation (1) 
brings out the advantages of pension wealth estimates over replacement rates. 
Firstly, this is a measure that expressly takes into account the period for which 
benefits will be received. Increased longevity increases pension wealth, but does not 
impact replacement rates. Similarly a higher pension age decreases pension wealth, 
while it does not show up in replacement rates. Secondly, pension wealth measures 
the entire income stream, rather than just one payment. A reform changing 
indexation would not change the replacement rate at retirement, but it would clearly 
show up in pension wealth estimates.  
There are two ways in which pension wealth is calculated. The empirical method 
uses income/wealth survey data and is retrospective.20 By contrast, the institutional 
approach tries to calculate prospective pension entitlements by applying “the pension 
system‟s parameters – such as accrual rates, minimum pensions, indexation rules, 
eligibility requirements etc. – to calculate pension benefits”21 for a number of stylised 
cases and then grosses up results. This is the approach taken in this paper. Pension 
wealth estimates, covering only state pensions22, were computed for the ten 
countries under study using the OECD‟s APEX23. Our estimates compare outcomes 
for those retiring under pre-reform systems with forecasts for those who will retire in 
2050 under the reformed systems. The OECD publishes pension wealth estimates 
for the standard full-career case (see Table 4). By contrast, we try to approximate 
reality better by adopting a measure of career length based on Labour Force Survey 
data on activity rates by age and gender.24 In all ten countries, elderly women are 
much more at-risk-of-poverty than elderly men. Yet, by assuming full careers for 
women, OECD estimates of pension wealth for women are higher than those for 
men, as women have longer life expectancy. Also, rather than focus on the average 
person, our focus is on individuals in the bottom half of the wage distribution who are 
more highly dependent on state pensions.  
 
                                            
20
 For a discussion of this approach see European Central Bank (2009). 
21
 See Whitehouse (2003). 
22
 Like the OECD, we assume no income other than state pensions when computing entitlement to 
minimum pensions. This may boost pension generosity in some countries.  
23
 APEX (Analysis of Pension Entitlements across countries model) codes the rules of a nation‟s 
pension system (vetted by officials from that country). It is used in the OECD‟s publications 
and is also used by the EU Commission as part of the OMC. 
24
 More details on this are in the appendix. Like the OECD, we model individual benefits. This may 
weaken results for countries where benefits depend also on partner‟s income. 
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Table 4: Net pension wealth estimates for current pension systems (multiple of 
average wage) 
 
Male full-career 
on average 
wage 
 
Male actual-
career in 
bottom half of 
wage 
distribution 
Female full-
career on 
average wage 
 
Female actual-
career in 
bottom half of 
wage 
distribution 
Austria 7.8 8.1 8.6 8.2 
Finland 7.5 5.3 8.9 5.8 
France 8.3 6.8 9.4 5.5 
Germany 6.1 5.2 7.4 4.8 
Hungary 9.2 6.2 11.4 8.5 
Italy 8.8 8.4 9.6 8.4 
Poland 7.0 4.6 7.4 6.2 
Slovakia 9.2 8.3 11.3 8.7 
Sweden 6.6 6.2 7.5 6.1 
UK 4.4 3.8 5.1 4.5 
Average 7.0 5.9 8.0 6.0 
Note: Net pension wealth for actual-career case based on labour market participation 
by age and sex data. See appendix for details. The actual-career case reflects the 
pension entitlements for those earning a wage up to the 50th percentile of the wage 
distribution.  
Source: OECD (2011) and own estimates using same model used in OECD (2011). 
Across the ten countries, adjusting for actual-careers and the level of wages lowers 
net pension wealth. The reduction is largest for women, who get only 80% of the full-
career average wage entitlement. The reduction for men is also strong, at 15%, 
particularly in countries with low employment rates (e.g. Slovakia). While the full-
career estimates suggest women get the equivalent of one year‟s average wage 
more than men, adjusting for lower participation and wages, reveals that they get 
roughly the same amount as men. Links between the level of contributions and that 
of benefits offset most of the impact of having higher longevity. If pensions 
maintained their relative value over time, one would expect the difference in gender 
longevity to be reflected in an equivalent gap in pension wealth. By contrast, across 
these ten countries while post-retirement longevity is a third higher for women, even 
assuming the same wage and labour participation, net pension wealth of women is 
just 15% higher. The worst affected are those with long retirement periods where 
pensions are indexed to prices. For instance, in Poland while the gender longevity 
differential is 60%, that in pension wealth is just 6%. Unsurprisingly the risk-of-
11 
poverty among elderly women in Poland is 6.9 percentage points (70%) higher than 
for men.  
Table 5: Net pension wealth requirement to remain out of risk-of-poverty (multiple of 
average wage) 
 
Men Women 
2005 2050 2005 2050 
Austria 5.1 7.2 6.5 7.2 
Finland 4.9 6.1 6.1 6.9 
France 6.5 7.6 7.7 8.5 
Germany 5.1 6.0 5.8 6.6 
Hungary 5.3 7.5 6.6 7.2 
Italy 5.3 7.4 6.3 7.2 
Poland 4.2 6.7 5.9 7.7 
Slovakia 5.3 7.1 6.2 7.0 
Sweden 5.3 6.2 6.1 6.9 
UK 5.0 7.0 5.3 5.7 
Average 5.3 6.9 6.2 7.1 
Note: Net pension wealth requirement is the pension wealth required so that the 
average annual pension keeps one above the risk-of-poverty (60% of the median 
equivalised income).  
Source: Own estimates using discount rate of 2% and Eurostat life expectancy 
projections. 
To link better the indicator to the risk-of-poverty,25 we compute the pension flows that 
would enable an annual income equal to the poverty threshold throughout retirement. 
If pension wealth is higher than this „pension requirement‟, on average, the system 
would be preventing poverty.26 Pension requirements for 2005 and 2050, presented 
in Table 5, suggest for instance, that Austrian men require net pension wealth of at 
least 5.1 times mean wages if they are to stay out of poverty, on average, during 
retirement. Women have a higher requisite than men, as they live longer and in some 
countries, have lower pension ages. The benefit of having this benchmark is that it 
directly conveys information about pension adequacy. Thus, if in Austria to remain, 
on average, out of risk-of-poverty a man needs pension wealth equivalent to 5.1 
                                            
25
 In this paper we focus on the poverty alleviation dimension of adequacy. Pension wealth can be 
used to look at income replacement (by defining measures in the person‟s own wage) and the 
intergenerational dimension (by comparing successive cohorts‟ pension wealth). 
26
 Note that since transfers are not constant for all years, even when pension wealth is equal to the 
„net pension requirement‟ there may be years when one could be at-risk-of-poverty.  
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times the average wage, this immediately suggests that current pension wealth of 8.1 
is more than sufficient. By contrast knowing that the gross replacement rate for 
someone on the mean wage in Austria is 69% tells us very little, especially since 
replacement rates are in terms of one‟s previous income and not the current poverty 
threshold.  
At present, the lowest requirement is for Polish men, while the highest is for French 
women. However this need not remain the case. The other benefit of the pension 
requirement benchmark is that it moves in line with longevity. If pension wealth stays 
the same, the benchmark helps us realise that pensioners have to spread it over a 
longer period. By contrast, a replacement rate is not usually affected by a change in 
longevity.27 Similarly having a benchmark improves our understanding of pension age 
changes. The latter leave replacement rates unchanged while reducing pension 
wealth. Using replacement rates, one would conclude there was no change in 
generosity, and vice-versa if one uses pension wealth. However by reducing the 
period in retirement, pension age changes also limit the pension requirement. For 
instance, at present Polish men, due to low longevity, have a pension requirement 
considerably lower than UK men – who face their same pension age. By 2050, this 
will be reversed, even though Polish men will still have shorter life spans than UK 
men. However the latter will get their pensions at 68, rather than at 65 like Polish 
men. Table 5 shows that the pension requirement for men is going to rise more than 
that for women. This reflects the fact that pension age equalisation will offset part of 
the rise in female longevity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
27
 Unless in the system the annual benefit depends on the period over which the cumulative 
entitlements need to be spread. In this case, higher longevity lowers replacement rates. 
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Table 6: Net pension wealth estimates for those in the bottom half of the wage 
distribution (modelled to reflect their projected actual career) retiring in 2050 (multiple 
of average wage) 
 
Men Women 
Net pension 
wealth 2050 
% Change 
on 2005 
Net pension 
wealth 2050 
% Change on 
2005 
Austria 8.1 -1 7.3 -11 
Finland 8.5 +61 8.2 +43 
France 5.7 -15 6.5 +18 
Germany 6.0 +16 6.4 +35 
Hungary 7.2 +17 7.0 -17 
Italy 7.1 -16 6.1 -28 
Poland 4.9 +6 4.4 -28 
Slovakia 5.2 -37 4.8 -45 
Sweden 6.7 +8 6.5 +6 
UK 5.2 +36 5.3 +18 
Average 6.0 +2 6.0 +1 
Note: See Note to Table 4. 
Source: OECD (2011) and own estimates using same model used in OECD (2011).  
Table 6 presents net pension wealth estimates for 2050 for the bottom half of the 
wage distribution computed using Commission activity rate forecasts and Eurostat 
longevity projections. These estimates suggest that despite cuts in generosity and 
higher pension ages,28 net pension wealth should still rise slightly across the 
countries under review.29 The increase in pension entitlements is lower than the 
expected rise in the period in retirement. Pension wealth will need to be spread more 
thinly across a longer retirement period. Table 7 illustrates this development. At 
present pension entitlements across these ten EU countries translate in an 
achievable poverty threshold of 67% for men and 52% for women in the bottom half 
of the wage distribution. By 2050, pension wealth, if spread evenly through 
retirement, would enable the average man, previously in the bottom half of the wage 
distribution, to have an income equivalent to 60% of the contemporary equivalised 
median income. For women, however, there should be a slight improvement, to 53%. 
The largest decline in achievable thresholds is for low-income men in Slovakia, 
followed closely by women in the same country. At present pension generosity in 
                                            
28
 In the absence of reforms, pension wealth would have grown by 47% for men and 26% for women, 
which coupled with the larger cohort size would have caused large fiscal burdens. 
29
 Assuming full careers, men‟s pension wealth would rise by 3% and women‟s drop by 5%. Higher 
participation should offset part of the impact of reduced pension system generosity. 
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Slovakia is at par with neighbouring Austria. Reforms have, however, tightened the 
link between benefits and contributions, and reduced the progressiveness of the 
benefit formula. Moreover the state pension was partially replaced by a mandatory 
private defined contribution pension30.  
Similar reforms were carried out in Poland, and the results are expected to be quite 
similar. The state pension, by itself, will no longer maintain low-income individuals, 
particularly women, out of relative poverty. By contrast in Germany, France and the 
UK pension reforms have tended to strengthen or maintain the poverty alleviation 
function, notably by improving the generosity of minimum pensions. Weak indexation 
and a long retirement period interact to push people into poverty in their old age, 
increasing the importance of having adequate minimum pensions in place. These 
estimates also show that the tightening of links between contributions made and 
benefits received makes it more crucial to have active labour market policies unless 
countries are ready to countenance an increase in pensioner poverty. Similarly 
countries need to have adequate crediting provisions, if they want to reduce gender 
income inequalities in old age.  
Table 7: Achievable poverty thresholds based on net pension wealth entitlements of 
those in the bottom half of the wage distribution (% of equivalised median income) 
 
Men Women 
2005 2050 2005 2050 
Austria 95 74 68 61 
Finland 65 66 57 58 
France 63 59 44 59 
Germany 61 59 48 56 
Hungary 70 65 68 59 
Italy 95 68 68 51 
Poland 66 50 55 35 
Slovakia 93 51 74 41 
Sweden 70 65 59 56 
UK 46 59 39 56 
Average 67 60 52 53 
Source: Own estimates using same model used in OECD (2011). Net pension 
requirement based on discount rate of 2% and Eurostat life expectancy projections. 
The EU Commission‟s pension adequacy indicator, i.e. the change in net 
replacement rates, similarly to the estimates of achievable poverty thresholds 
                                            
30
 Since the financial crisis, this second pillar has increasingly been put under question.  
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suggests lower generosity by 2050. However there are important differences, as can 
be seen in Table 8. Firstly, the proposed indicators suggest slightly improved 
outcomes for women, which is not apparent when looking at the OMC indicator as 
the latter is gender neutral and cannot take into account increased entitlements due 
to higher labour participation. Secondly, the full-careers assumption appears to hide 
the full impact of reforms that penalise not having a full career, for instance the 
changes effected in Italy, Austria and Slovakia.31 Thirdly, by focusing on those on 
average wages, the OMC indicator fails to give due importance to reforms that have 
increased system progressiveness, such as better minimum pensions in Germany, 
France and the UK. Finally, and most importantly, while the OMC indicator suggests 
a decline in generosity, it does not readily convey whether this is of concern. By 
focusing on theoretical generosity, the OMC indicator boosts the level of pension 
entitlements, particularly for women. It also fails to register the increased influence 
that weak indexation will have on the efficacy of pensions and does not capture the 
impact of pension age changes. 
Table 8: Change in achievable poverty thresholds compared with OMC indicator on 
net replacement rates (percentage points) 
 Change in poverty 
threshold by 2050 
(men) 
Change in poverty 
threshold by 2050 
(women) 
Change in 
replacement rates 
by 2050 
Austria -21 -8 +5  
Finland +2 +1 -8  
France -3 +16 -17  
Germany -2 +8 -3  
Hungary -4 -9 +5  
Italy -28 -17 +2  
Poland -16 -20 -17  
Slovakia -42 -32 -7  
Sweden -5 -3 -7  
UK +13 +17 +2  
Average -7 +2 -5  
Source: OECD (2011) and own estimates using same model used in OECD (2011). 
Replacement rates from European Commission (2010), except Hungary from 
European Commission (2009) as our estimates do not cover the most recent reform 
in this country. 
                                            
31
 For Sweden, the fact that actual careers are close to the full-career assumption results in similar 
developments in the achievable poverty threshold and in net replacement rates. 
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Another benefit of pension wealth is that it can be used to measure fiscal pressures. 
Table 9 presents estimates of the contribution rate required to pay the entitlements of 
the 2005 and 2050 pensioner cohorts.32 Across the ten countries a contribution rate 
of 17% is required for the 2005 generation. This compares well with the 20% 
contribution rate currently charged by governments across these countries. Had no 
reforms taken place, the required contribution rate would have nearly tripled by 2050. 
The reforms partially addressed these pressures, such that the required increase is 
now of 10 percentage points. There are some notable outliers, such as France, 
Poland and Slovakia, where the increase is around double this rise, reflecting weaker 
labour participation combined with more rapid ageing. The trends in contribution rates 
are starker than those in pension spending projections. This is because they focus on 
the whole outlay for a cohort rather than give a snapshot for just a year.  
 
Table 9: The fiscal pressures faced by pension systems 
 
Contribution rate required (%) Pension spending (% of GDP) 
2005 2050 2005 2050 
Austria 19.3 26.8 13.2 16.4 
Finland 8.7 20.9 10.4 14.9 
France 21.0 41.4 12.8 15.1 
Germany 11.8 20.9 11.1 13.0 
Hungary 37.7 44.5 10.7 13.5 
Italy 29.7 31.6 14.3 15.7 
Poland 14.4 34.7 13.7 10.0 
Slovakia 20.6 38.7 7.4 12.2 
Sweden 11.5 21.5 10.4 9.9 
UK 9.1 10.3 6.7 8.2 
Average 17.5 27.2 11.4 12.7 
Source: Pension spending from European Commission (2010). Own estimate of the 
contribution rate computed by multiplying mean pension wealth by system 
dependency ratio. 
  
                                            
32
 The intuition behind this is described in the appendix. For simplicity this approach assumes 
pensions are financed by the current workers, while in reality they can be debt-financed.  
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4 Conclusion 
While useful, theoretical replacement rates estimated for full-career males on 
average wages are ill-suited for policy analysis especially of increasingly common 
reforms like pension age changes or moves to make state pensions more defined 
contribution. Replacement rates are hard to interpret as they do not have an 
underlying benchmark which allows their value to be deemed adequate or 
inadequate. Moreover they are a point-in-time measure which ignores the impact of 
benefit indexation rules. Moreover the emphasis on assumptions which are very 
unrepresentative of real-life labour market conditions also makes them deceptive, 
particularly in relation to current and future pension outcomes for women and those 
on low incomes.  
This paper has suggested an alternative approach based on estimates of pension 
wealth calculated using more realistic labour market assumptions. These estimates 
are then compared to a benchmark reflecting the pension entitlement required to 
keep an individual out of relative poverty through retirement. By focusing on total 
pension flows, this approach is able to account for changes in the value of pensions 
over time. It also focuses analysis on the expected outcome, and lets the latter be 
affected by changes in longevity and pension ages. When applied to study reforms 
enacted since the 1990s in ten European countries, the resulting estimates suggest 
that these reforms have decreased generosity significantly, but that the poverty 
alleviation function remains strong in those countries where minimum pensions were 
improved. Theoretical replacement rates indicate a decline in generosity, but fail to 
give a precise picture of who will be worst affected and the extent, if any, of resulting 
concerns. By contrast the pension wealth adequacy indicators show that moves to 
link benefits to contributions have raised concerns for women and those on low 
incomes which policymakers, particularly those in Eastern European countries, 
should consider and tackle. The pension wealth indicators also suggest that while 
reforms have reduced the fiscal challenge of ageing, in many countries pressures will 
persist and further reforms are likely. 
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Appendix 
This paper adopts a measure of career lengths based on Eurostat Labour Force 
Survey data. Essentially the probability of a person to be active at a given age is set 
at the activity rate at that age. These probabilities are summed to arrive at the total 
career length. The latter is then forecast to 2050 using EU Commission projections of 
activity rates by age. Table A1 shows that career length should rise in most countries. 
The increase among women reflects both a cohort effect – a catch-up in gender 
employment rates – and a policy effect – gender pension age equalisation. The 
change for men mostly reflects tightening of early retirement schemes. 
Table A1: Assumed career length 
 2005 2050 
Male Female Male Female 
Austria 35 29 36 35 
Finland 36 34 39 38 
France 35 30 35 33 
Germany 37 31 41 41 
Hungary 31 23 32 29 
Italy 35 23 37 28 
Poland 33 27 35 28 
Slovakia 36 30 35 31 
Sweden 38 36 42 39 
UK 38 30 41 37 
Source: Own workings using Labour Force Survey data and Commission (2010) 
projections. 
In a financially balanced pension system, the following identity holds: 
(Average pension/Average wage) × No of pensioners =  
(Average contribution/Average wage) × No of 
contributors……...................................…(1) 
Rearranging identity (1) and redefining terms: 
Contribution rate = Gross pension level × System dependency 
ratio……………….....(2) 
To turn (2) from a point-in-time indicator to a cohort indicator, we introduce pension 
wealth: 
Contribution required = Gross pension wealth × System dependency 
ratio……….....(3) 
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Gross pension wealth multiplied by the ratio of beneficiaries to contributors gives the 
number of years of average wages required to finance total pension transfers to a 
generation. For example, if pensioners have an entitlement of 5 years average 
wages, and the dependency ratio is 2, then every worker needs to forgo 2.5 years of 
average wages to finance pension transfers. This amount is transformed into a 
contribution rate by dividing it by career length.  
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